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Shame and conflict – Lysis’s philosophical akrasia 
Albert Joosse, Utrecht University, Albert.Joosse@phil.uu.nl  
Presented to the Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy at its meeting 
with The American Philological Association, January 2011 
I 
At one stage in Plato’s Lysis, Socrates is questioning Lysis’s friend, Menexenus. 
When they have reached another dead end, Socrates asks him 
“Is it perhaps, Menexenus,” I said, “that we weren’t inquiring in the right way at all?” 
“I think so, Socrates,” said Lysis, and blushed as he said it; 
Here Lysis is breaking in on Menexenus’s conversation, although perhaps, Socrates’s 
question being about the way they have been proceeding, the conversation is more or less 
over by now, and we should not consider the foul too serious. In any case, Lysis shows a 
lack of restraint in responding the way he does, which is also emphasized in the comment 
that the narrator makes about Lysis’s being ashamed – this narrator happens to be 
Socrates: 
for it seemed to me that the words escaped without his wanting them to, because of the 
intensity with which he was paying attention to what was being said, and it was clear that it 
was the same, too, all the while he was listening.1  
And having said this, Socrates tells us that he went on questioning Lysis, because he wanted to 
give Menexenus a break. It is with Lysis’s comment, his reaction, and Socrates’s explanation of 
both that we will be concerned. 
We will be concerned with these things because understanding Lysis’s behaviour is 
an important part of interpreting the dialogue. Rather than being one of the ‘dramatic 
stretches [that] are so uncunningly tacked on to the interrogation-stretches’,2 this episode 
shows Lysis’s progress under Socratic questioning. This merits careful interpretation 
especially in a Platonic dialogue, where the relation between narrated arguments and 
narrated action is always significant but seldom clear.3  
What we will see on closer inspection is a conflict within Lysis between his newly 
stimulated love for wisdom and his habitual self-restraint. Born and raised an aristocrat, 
Lysis experiences conflict when his mind is enticed outside its wonted limits. What he 
experiences is, in fact, shame of himself: he notices that part of him falls short of the ideal 
he has been brought up with and to which part of him still adheres. His is a philosophical 
akrasia. 
1 213d1-5: ‘ara mê, ên d’ego", o" Menexene, to parapan ouk ortho"s ezêtoumen? – ouk emoige dokei, 
o" So"krates, ephê ho Lusis kai hama eipo"n êruthriasen: edokei gar moi akont’auton ekpheugein to 
lekhthen dia to sphodra prosekhein ton noun tois legomenois, dêlon d’ên kai hote êkroato houto"s 
ekho"n.’ I use the translation by Penner & Rowe. 
2 Ryle: 202. 
3 ‘[A]ll aspects work together, and none is fully intelligible without the others’, Penner & Rowe: xii; 
Gadamer speaks of a ‘Doric harmony’ between logos and ergon (passim; the Doric harmony comes 
from Laches 193d11-e2). Other studies of the Lysis that have focused particularly on the action aspect 
of the dialogue include Hoerber, Haden (both not convincingly), Tindale, Gonzalez 1995. 
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In approaching a passage like this, one is easily misled by what we think nowadays 
that emotions look like, and what behaviour can be expected of young people. For this reason 
it seems useful to start with the considered view of an ancient Greek, that is, Aristotle’s 
description of what it is to be ashamed. Central features of his analysis allow us to identify 
Lysis’s case as broadly a case of shame. However, it will also become clear that Aristotle’s is 
not the last word on the matter, since he has hardly any room for the notion of feeling 
ashamed before oneself, rather than before others. The Lysis portrays what Democritus 
advocated as a moral principle: that one should above all be one’s own judge, and feel shame 
in one’s own regard rather than in others’. Against the background of these other two ancient 
texts on shame, we will be able to return to the Lysis passage. 
In order not to have to consider the subtle differences specific to English between, for 
instance, ‘embarrassment’ and ‘shame’, I treat ‘shame’ as a thin notion that covers such 
differentiations. 
I I  
Since W.W. Fortenbaugh’s 1970 article, it has become common practice to refer to the 
definitions of emotions in Aristotle’s Rhetoric as reliable guides to what the ancient Greek 
considered these emotions to be. In the case of shame, Aristotle says what it is, and towards whom 
it is felt. The core of it is as follows: 
Let shame, then, be a kind of pain or disturbance in connection with those evils that appear to 
pertain to disrepute, whether present, past or future.4  
A little later on Aristotle gives a more expanded version: 
And since shame is an imagination connected with disrepute, and felt for its own sake and not 
for its consequences, and none considers reputation except through those who confer it, one 
must needs feel shame before those whom one holds in regard.5  
In both formulations the focus of the emotion is a perceived disrepute (adoxia). Since 
repute is conferred by others, he says, this emotion is felt before others.6  
Aristotle says that the things we feel ashamed about, the grounds of shame, involve 
moral weakness. He mentions examples of cowardice, greed, weakness, intemperance. 
Because of this essential connection between bad character and shame, there can be no place 
for shame in the life of a good man, he says in a brief section in the Nicomachean Ethics. 
In this section he also observes that shame makes one turn red, a useful physical marker that 
we can use to recognize what Aristotle calls shame in other texts and contexts. 
In Aristotle’s view, then, as he has outlined it in the Rhetoric, shame is felt at flaws of 
character before the reputation-conferring regard of others. This is fair enough as far as 
4 1383b12-13: ‘esto" de aiskhune lupe tis e tarakhe peri ta eis adoxian phainomena pherein 
to"n kako"n, e paronto"n e gegonoto"n e mellonto"n [...]’ The translation is Lawson-Tancred’s. 
5 1384a24-6: ‘epei de peri adoxias phantasia estin he aiskhune, kai tautes autes kharin alla me 
to"n apobainonto"n, oudeis de tes doxes phrontizei all’e dia tous doxazontas, anagke toutous 
aiskhunesthai ho"n logon ekhei’ 
6 Cf. Konstan 103-4. One could read 1384a24-6 as an analytic statement that specifies that for any 
attribution of reputation, there must be an agent to do the attributing, and subsequently subsume the 
self under the agents that are capable of doing the attributing. This would attenuate the degree to which 
Aristotle’s account focuses on the focus on others. There is no mention, however, of this type of 
subsumption in the rest of Aristotle’s story. I take it as the most natural reading of this passage that it 
concerns other people. 
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it goes, but it does not go far enough. As will emerge in my discussion of the Lysis episode 
below, Lysis primarily feels shame before himself, not others. 
The phenomenon of feeling ashamed before oneself is not alien to the ancient 
Greeks. In three of the surviving fragments of Democritus, shame before oneself is 
recommended as a moral rule. The most expressive of these fragments (B 264) says: 
Do not feel more shame [aideisthai] before men than before yourself; be no more willing to 
do evil if no one is to find out than if all men are to know. But show respect [aideisthai] 
above all before yourself and establish this law for your soul, so as to do no unseemly act.7 
Democritus here sets up an internal ideal against which a good man should measure 
his conduct. Falling short of that ideal is a reason to be ashamed, even if no one else is there 
to watch you; you are your own judge. To be sure, the standard situation in the background of 
this piece of advice is one in which you feel shame before others, but that is hardly suprising. 
All the same, as Douglas Cairns puts it, ‘in exhorting his audience to experience self-directed 
aido"s he is clearly not urging them to do the impossible’.8 Moreover, in selecting shame 
(aido"s and aiskhune) to frame these maxims, Democritus chooses an internal emotional 
disposition as a guide to behaviour, rather than simply rational calculation of the best 
consequences.9  
An emotional response of precisely this kind is what we see in Lysis’s case, as well as an 
instance of the kind of morally commendable behaviour that distinguishes the well-bred 
aristocrat from the man in the street. 
I I I  
Let us try to get to know Lysis a little better, so we also understand his emotions 
better. We might start with his family. In the dialogue we hear that Lysis was called by his 
patronymic, son of Democrates, ‘because his father is so widely known’.10 We also hear, 
when Ctesippus mocks Hippothales, who is in love with Lysis, that Hippothales went around 
singing ‘about Democrates, and Lysis, the boy’s grandfather, and about all the boy’s 
ancestors, things like wealth and racehorses and victories at the Pythian and Isthmian and 
Nemean Games with the four-horse team and the single horse and rider’11; the popularity of 
Lysis the grandfather seems to be confirmed by a large number of red-figure vases with the 
inscription ‘Lusis kalos’, which are dated to the 470s and 460s.12 This family was from the 
deme of Aixone, to the south of Athens, where there was a cult of Heracles. When Ctesippus 
continues he says something about that: ‘It was the reception given to Heracles that he was 
going through in some poem the day before yesterday – how because of their kinship with 
Heracles their ancestor received Heracles as a visitor, the ancestor 
7 ‘Meden ti mallon tous anthro"pous aideisthai heo"tou mede ti mallon exergazesthai kakon, ei 
mellei medeis eidesein e hoi pantes anthro"poi: all’heo"ton malista aideisthai, kai touton nomon 
tei psukhei kathestanai, ho"ste meden poiein anepitedeion’ (Trans. Kahn) The other relevant fragments 
are 84, 244. 
8 Cairns: 370. 
9 Ibid.: 368. 
10 204e3-5: ‘eti patrothen eponomazetai dia to sphodra ton pateria gigno"skesthai autou’ 
11 205c2-6: ‘ha de he polis hole aidei peri Demokratous kai Lusidos tou pappou tou paidos kai 
panto"n peri to"n progono"n, ploutous te kai hippotrophias kai nikas Puthoi kai Isthmoi kai Nemea 
tethrippois te kai kelesi, tauta poiei te kai legei, pros de toutous eti touto"n kroniko"tera’ 
12 Nails: 195 
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being himself descended from Zeus and the daughter of the founder of the deme’;13 it is 
tempting to infer that Lysis’s family were priests of the cult at Aixone.14  
Clearly, then, Lysis was a high-born youth, and apparently a very beautiful one too. 
‘How noble and dashing a love this is that you’ve discovered!’15 Socrates compliments 
Hippothales. He is certainly worth a guardian’s constant protection, in any case, as Socrates 
learns with feigned wonder when he questions Lysis.16 Such high standing and great beauty 
call for exceptional restraint, the virtue par excellence for young people.17 And not only 
can we expect Lysis to share this ideal of how a young boy should be, it seems that he pretty 
much embodies that ideal. His is a model character, ‘worth talking about not just for his 
beauty but for his beauty-and-goodness’,18 as Socrates observes at entering the palaestra. 
Lysis is standing with some others, forming a circle around yet others who are playing 
knucklebones. When Socrates and Ctesippus sit down to have a chat, with the non-evident 
but very explicit intention of seducing Lysis to come sit with them, he looks at them every 
now and again, but stays where he is, ‘hesitating to come over to us on his own’.19 Later, 
when responding to Socrates’s questions is becoming rather risqué, Lysis is the first to fall 
silent.20  
So this is the Lysis that becomes involved in a dialectic conversation with Socrates. 
And this is the Lysis who responds to his own words by feeling ashamed of himself. The 
blushing episode shows us, on the micro level, what conversation with Socrates is doing to 
him. Two other episodes in the dialogue are worth mentioning at this point, as they illustrate 
the same point on a more macro level. The first is the talk Socrates has with Lysis when 
Menexenus is called away for a while to do some sacrificing; this is before the blushing 
episode. When Lysis agrees with Socrates that in order to be happy, you must be able to do 
anything you want, Socrates asks him why there are so many things that his parents won’t 
allow him to do. Lysis’s first answer is that he has not come of age yet. But Socrates rejects 
this answer, and makes Lysis do so too. Instead, Socrates says, it is wisdom that you must go 
after. For if you are wise, everything and everyone will belong to you. This appeal to Lysis’s 
vanity is turned on its head when Socrates points out that this is evidently 
13 205c6-d2: ‘ton gar tou Herakleous xenismon pro"ten hemin en poiemati tini dieiei, ho"s dia ten tou 
Herakleous suggeneian ho progonos auto"n hupodexaito ton Heraklea, gegeno"s autos ek Dios te kai 
tes tou demou arkhegetou thugatros [...]’ 
14 ‘Probable’: Nails: 196. Lysis’s father-in-law was to be one Isthmonicus, probably the same 
Isthmonicus who was among the signatories to the Peace of Nicias. Lysis’s gravestone has been 
found, for which see Stroud. 
15 204e9-10: ‘ho"s gennaion kai neanikon touton ton ero"ta pantakhei aneures’ 
16 208c-d. 
17 In this context, ‘aido"s’ in the sense of the disposition not to do shameful things and ‘so"phronsune’ 
are closely related. A key text is the Charmides (with as one of Charmides’s proposed definitions of 
so"phrosune precisely aido"s, 160e2-5), which is a close kin of the Lysis in terms of content, style, 
and method. The theme can be traced back to Telemachus (Od. 3.24, 4.158-60). The EN passage 
referred to above states that aido"s befits young people, but not the old (1128b16-8). See also Cairns: 
104, 314-5, 373. 
18 207a2-3: ‘ou to “kalos ei, nai”monon axios akousai, all’hoti kalos te kagathos’ (Penner & 
Rowe read ei]nai). 
19 207a5-7: ‘peristrephomenos oun ho Lusis thama epeskopeito hemas, kai delos en epithumo"n 
proselthein. teo"s men oun eporei te kai o"knei monos prosienai [...]’ 
20 222a4. 
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not the case now. So you are not wise, he says to Lysis, and therefore your parents do not 
love you either.21 Socrates makes parental love fundamentally dependent on the child’s 
wisdom, and rejects traditional heredity in favour of sophistic, knowledge-based property 
claims. 
The second episode that shows the conflict between Socrates’s influence and the 
traditional order is at the end of the dialogue. The guardians of Menexenus and Lysis enter to take 
them home; Socrates and the others try to prevent them doing so, and, significantly, Menexenus 
and Lysis do not wish to go. In the end the guardians win, but the gathering has not made the 
boys more obedient.22  
In this context, philosophia, the desire for wisdom, is something that upsets the 
traditional order.23 It is also in these terms, I contend, that we should understand Lysis’s 
shame. In this case, the conflict becomes internal. Lysis has made his society’s ideas about 
virtue and proper behaviour his own; but Socrates’s conversation incites other desires in him. 
What he is offered here is so appealing that he cannot but be spell-bound. And then he blurts 
out: 
“I think so, Socrates,” said Lysis, and blushed as he said it; for it seemed to me that the 
words escaped without his wanting them to, because of the intensity with which he was 
paying attention to what was being said.24  
It is his love of wisdom that both delights Socrates, as he says in the immediate sequel, and 
conflicts with Lysis’s habitual self-control.25 He did not want it to happen, but it did. In 
effect, we have here a case of akrasia, as it were; the pleasures of wisdom have proved too 
strong. Or, if this image captures the situation better, Lysis’s traditional view of himself has 
been lulled asleep or otherwise by the better Marsyas, to paraphrase Alcibiades,26 only to 
wake up startled when he hears himself say something he did not plan on saying. 
To be sure, it also requires restraint to be a man that Socrates would recognize as 
good, but the type of restraint is different from the traditional one. Consider what Socrates 
says in the Charmides, in response to Charmides’s idea that temperance (sôphrosunê) 
consists in doing things quietly (hêsuchêi); that would mean, Socrates protests, that it is 
temperate to understand and investigate slowly (hêsuchêi) as well, but that cannot be right 
(159b-60b). Even if his refutation in part depends on what is traditionally held to belong to 
temperance (as when he praises swiftness of body), the direction Socrates takes makes clear 
21 207d-10d. Francisco Gonzalez 2000 sets up more elaborately the contrast with traditional 
notions. 
22 223a1-b3; and cf. Penner & Rowe: 185-6, Smith Pangle: 35. 
23 This would not be the only context in which Socrates is associated with that sort of thing, of course. 
Still, it has been repeatedly said of this dialogue, and sometimes specifically of Socrates’s first 
conversation with Lysis that it was written to show how very law-abiding Socrates was and how 
beneficial his conversation (e.g. von Arnim: 65; Bluck: 62; Cornford (CAH) cit. in Hoerber 1959: 
16). 
24 See note 1. Earlier, too, it was said that he paid such intense attention, right after the talk in which 
Socrates told Lysis that his parents do not love him: Lysis asks Socrates to put the same questions to 
Menexenus as he has put to him; but Socrates says that Lysis can communicate them to Menexenus 
himself at some later time, ‘pantôs gai proseikes ton noun’ (211a7). 
25 213d6-e1: ‘egô oun boulomenos ton te Menexenon anapausai kai ekeinou hêstheis têi 
philosophiai, houtô metabalôn pros ton Lusin epoioumên tous logous [...]’ 
26 Symposium 215c-d. 
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that he regards mental acuity as much more virtuous than the traditional emphasis on 
knowing your place as a young person. 
In Lysis’s case we see this conflict acted out within one young person’s mind. His 
shame, I suggest, is the response of one part of Lysis to another part of Lysis; or it is Lysis in 
his composed mode versus Lysis as he is when enticed by dialectic. Many interlocutors of 
Socrates complain that he is a torpedo fish and that they are left numb; in Lysis’s case the 
companionship with Socrates makes him too quick to catch himself.27 He sees in himself a 
discrepancy between the ideal that he has set up as his standard and the reality of his 
behaviour.28 Meeting in this way Democritus’s demand to consider himself his most 
important judge, he shows himself a paragon of traditional virtue, who is at the same time 
being attracted away from that towards Socratic virtue. 
I V  
In Socratic eyes it is not corruption of the young to show them the way to wisdom, 
but it is clear that this way brings new values with it, which at times conflict with the 
traditional values of Athenian society. Plato visualizes this conflict in Lysis’s shame. It 
shows the limitations of an appeal to Aristotle as the authority on Greek emotions that in 
relying on his formulations only we would have missed the internalist aspect of what Lysis 
experiences.29 Ironically, it is in his traditional role that Lysis is most self-conscious, even if 
the Socratic virtue that he is being enticed towards is notoriously self-concerned, with its 
emphasis on the care of the self and on being aware of one’s ignorance. Half-way between 
the opening of the dialogue and the final scene, in which the boys join Socrates in active 
resistance against their guardians, the conflict that manifests itself in Lysis’s emotion shows 
us how Socratic questioning is causing in Lysis a love for wisdom that is growing beyond 
his control. 
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